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Abstract 
        We examine the relationship between equity incentives and earnings management in 
the banking industry. By focusing on this regulated industry and using industry-specific 
earnings management proxies, we provide evidence on the impact of regulation on 
earnings management arising from CEOs’ equity incentives.  We find that bank managers 
with high equity incentives are more likely to manage earnings, but only when capital 
ratios are closer to the minimum regulatory capital requirements. This finding indicates 
that in the banking industry, potential regulatory intervention induces, rather than 
mitigates, earnings management arising from equity incentives.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
This paper investigates the relationship between managers’ equity incentives and 
earnings management in a regulated industry – the banking industry. Prior research has 
established a link between equity incentives and earnings management, as well as the 
occurrence of earnings restatement in non-regulated industries. Managers’ equity 
incentives, arising from stock-based compensation and stock/option ownership, can 
induce earnings management in the hope of increasing stock prices and the value of their 
equity holdings. For example, Cheng and Warfield (2005) find that managers with high 
equity incentives sell more shares after earnings announcements and are more likely to 
report earnings that meet or just beat analysts’ forecasts. Bergstresser and Philippon 
(2006) find that equity incentives are positively correlated with abnormal accruals. Burns 
and Kedia (2006) find that incentives to misreport earnings increase with the sensitivity 
of CEO’s option holdings to stock price, and Efendi et al. (2007) find that options in the 
money are an important determinant of the likelihood of earnings restatement.  
These studies generally exclude financial institutions and utilities primarily because 
managers in these regulated industries may have different motivations to manage 
earnings due to regulation (Burgstahler and Eames 2003). Thus, it is unclear from prior 
research whether managers with high equity incentives are more likely to manage 
earnings in regulated industries. We address this omission by investigating the equity 
incentive-earnings management link in banks.1  
Banks are critical components of the economy, have great influence on financial 
                                                 
1
 Financial institutions include banks, non-depository credit institutions, security and commodity brokers, 
insurance, real estate and holding companies, and other investment offices. This paper focuses on 
commercial banks because the extent of earnings management can be more precisely measured. We 
exclude regulated utilities from our analyses due to lack of more precise earnings management measures 
and we exclude insurance companies due to data availability requirements, which result in a small sample.   
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1326558
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markets, and have been at the center of the recent credit crisis (Eavis 2008). Thus, it is 
important to investigate whether earnings management incentives prevalent in other 
industries exist in this regulated industry. Compared to prior studies, which are based on 
pooled samples drawn from non-regulated industries, we can measure earnings 
management activities more accurately in the banking industry. Use of a more accurate 
measure in a single industry mitigates bias arising from measurement errors and their 
effects on tests of earnings management.  
In addition, by examining the link from equity incentives to earnings management 
for banks, we are able to provide insights into the effects of regulatory intervention on 
earnings management arising from equity incentives. For banks, regulatory authorities 
establish minimum capital requirements and increase monitoring of banks with low 
capital ratios, sometimes intervening in the operations of banks with inadequate capital 
and even to the point of dismissing management (Beatty et al. 1995). Given recent 
corporate scandals leading to various reforms to curb earnings management (e.g., 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002), it is important to understand the potential mitigating role of 
regulation on earnings management.  
While the potential regulatory intervention likely influences earnings management 
incentives, the direction of regulatory intervention effects is ambiguous. On the one hand, 
managers have incentives to engage in earnings management to avoid regulatory 
intervention (Collins et al. 1995; Beatty et al. 2002; Liu and Ryan 2006). When the 
likelihood of regulatory intervention is high, bank managers are subject to two possible 
costs: (1) lower compensation / job security and (2) lower value of their holdings of the 
bank’s stock and option, the latter of which is naturally related to the level of these 
managers’ stock/option holdings.  
 3 
Bank managers can increase capital as well as earnings through upward earnings 
management, such as by decreasing loan loss provisions and/or by increasing realized 
security gains. If the incentives to avoid regulatory attention are strong and more so when 
managers have high equity incentives, we expect that the association between equity 
incentives and earnings management exists in regulated industries and is enhanced when 
the likelihood of regulatory intervention is high.  
On the other hand, the likelihood for earnings management to be detected is high 
when regulators do intervene. Because the costs of engaging in earnings management are 
substantial, managers might not engage in earnings management in the first place. If this 
is the case, we would expect the relation between equity incentives and earnings 
management to be weaker in regulated industries, particularly when potential regulatory 
attention is mounting. Therefore, the extent to which regulation mitigates earnings 
management arising from equity incentives is an empirical question.2 
In this paper, we first investigate the overall relation between equity incentives and 
earnings management in banks and then examine how regulatory intervention affects this 
relation. As in prior research, we focus on chief executive officers (CEOs). Our measure 
of equity incentives includes CEOs’ stock and option holdings; it comprises 
unexercisable options, exercisable options, and stock ownership. Thus, it includes, but it 
is not limited to, stock-based compensation (newly granted options are included in 
unexercised options.) To measure earnings management in banks, we follow prior 
research, decomposing loan loss provision into nondiscretionary and discretionary 
components and using the discretionary component as the proxy for earnings 
                                                 
2
 Note that the main objective of regulatory intervention in the banking industry is not to detect earnings 
management. However, when capital ratios are close to the regulatory minimums and banks are subject to 
potential regulatory intervention, their financial reporting is subject to enhanced scrutiny by regulators, 
investors, and the SEC. Thus, the likelihood of detection of earnings management is higher.  
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management.  Decreasing the discretionary loan loss provision increases earnings and tier 
one capital.  
Based on 600 bank-year observations in the period 1994-2005, we find that unlike 
in non-regulated industries, managers’ equity incentives and earnings management are 
not positively correlated in the banking industry. However, when we partition the sample 
based on the likelihood of regulatory intervention, we find that the earnings management 
behavior varies with the likelihood of regulatory intervention. Specifically, we find that 
banks with low capital ratios – those likely subject to regulatory intervention – exhibit a 
significant relation between bank managers’ equity incentives and earnings management. 
In contrast, for banks with high capital ratios, equity incentives are not correlated with 
earnings management.  
In addition, we find that when bank CEOs have high equity incentives, they are 
more likely to manage earnings upward when capital ratios are low. For bank CEOs with 
low equity incentives and low capital ratios, we do not observe upward earnings 
management. Therefore, bank managers’ incentives to engage in upward earnings 
management are strong only when both of the following two conditions are satisfied: (1) 
bank CEOs have high equity incentives so that their personal welfare is more strongly 
correlated with bank performance and (2) the capital ratio is closer to regulatory 
minimums.  
To “close the loop” on the equity incentive – earning management link, we also 
examine bank managers’ subsequent trading, conditional on equity incentives and the 
extent of regulatory scrutiny. We find that bank managers with higher equity incentives 
are more likely to sell in the next year.  More importantly, we find that this positive 
relation is particularly strong for banks with low capital ratios. These results indicate that 
 5 
when regulatory scrutiny is likely to be high, bank CEOs with high equity incentives are 
more likely to sell in order to reduce their exposure to the potential regulatory 
intervention, thereby inducing earnings management. When we link CEOs’ future selling 
behavior directly to earnings management, we document a positive relation between 
earnings management and future sales for banks with low capital ratios. In contrast, bank 
CEOs with high equity incentives and lower regulatory scrutiny do not exhibit strong 
selling behavior and, as a result, do not manage earnings upward. 
Our primary results are robust to controls for year fixed effects, to alternative 
proxies for potential regulatory attention, and to other proxies for earnings management. 
We also explore an alternative explanation for our results based on differences in equity 
incentives between banks that are subject to potential regulatory intervention and those 
that are not. That is, it is possible that differences in equity incentives, rather than the 
differential level of regulatory intervention, lead to the difference in results. However, 
our follow-up analysis indicates that the two groups do not differ in the level of equity 
incentives.   
Our paper contributes to the literature by providing insights on how regulation 
affects earnings management incentives. While prior research has examined the impact of 
regulation on earnings management in general, our study is the first to examine earnings 
management arising from regulated CEOs’ equity incentives. Recent events indicate that 
this is an important earnings management context, given the high proportion of CEO 
compensation tied to options or stocks.  
Regulation is intended to monitor weak banks, thereby protecting investors, bank 
depositors, and the banking system; such regulation may deter managers from engaging 
in earnings management. However at the same time such regulation may induce 
 6 
managers to manage earnings to avoid such regulatory intervention and its potentially 
negative impact on managers.  Our evidence is consistent with the latter scenario, rather 
than the first. Our paper highlights the importance of both potential regulatory 
intervention and equity incentives in inducing earnings management in the bank setting.3   
This paper also contributes to the earnings management literature in several other 
dimensions. First, this paper controls for potential cross-industry effects by investigating 
the relationship between equity incentives and earnings management within a single 
regulated industry. Firms in the same industry are more homogeneous, allowing industry 
factors to be held constant and thereby controlling for possible omitted correlated 
variables. Second, banks are of particular interest, because they represent the main 
financial institutions that prior earnings management research has excluded. While our 
sample is relatively small, (due to Execucomp data constraints which limits us to large 
banks included in the S&P1500) , the fact that we find evidence of upward earnings 
management in weak banks and some evidence of downward earnings management in 
strong banks indicates that low test power of a small sample is not a serious concern.4 
Even in this sample, our sample banks include the major banks playing a significant role 
in the U.S. economy (e.g., Bank of America, Wells Fargo, Mellon Financial, Wachovia, 
Washington Mutual).  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses related 
studies and develops the hypothesis about equity incentives and earnings management in 
                                                 
3
 However, we caution that the results might not apply to other regulated industries. For example, while 
also regulated, insurance companies are largely regulated at the state level and one might argue that the 
level of scrutiny is different between insurance companies and banks, likely leading to different results if 
one were to study similar questions in insurance companies.  
4
 To phrase differently, the common problem of a small sample and low power is insignificant findings, 
which are difficult to interpret. This is not the case in our study. Another problem of a small sample is that 
the findings might not generalize to the population. While our findings do not necessarily apply to private 
banks and small public banks, we include most of the banks in the S&P1500, an important part of the 
financial system.  
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banks. We also discuss the impact of potential regulation intervention on such earnings 
management in Section II. Section III describes the sample and data. Section IV presents 
the research design and empirical results. Section V presents additional and sensitivity 
analyses, and Section VI concludes. 
II. PRIOR RESEARCH AND HYPOTHESES 
Below we first discuss prior bank earnings management research, followed by a 
discussion of prior research on the relationship between equity incentives and earnings 
management. We then discuss how regulation might affect earnings management induced 
by equity incentives. We state our hypotheses at the end of this section. 
Bank Earnings Management 
Bank earnings management is a significant part of the general earnings management 
literature. Bank earnings management is unique in two dimensions. First, one can 
examine unique earnings management incentives, such as regulatory monitoring. Second, 
one can develop more accurate earning management proxies in the bank setting because 
of the relatively homogeneous sample composition. We discuss earnings management 
proxies in Section III, and below we provide a very brief summary of prior studies on 
bank earnings management, organized by earnings management incentives.5 
Bank regulators use capital ratios to measure bank capital adequacy and to identify 
weak banks. As a result, banks with low capital ratios are likely to increase capital ratios 
via accruals (e.g., loan loss provisions) or real activities (e.g., security gains or losses) in 
order to avoid regulatory intervention. Prior research (e.g., Moyer 1990; Beatty et al. 
1995; Ahmed et al. 1999) provides strong evidence consistent with this hypothesis. For 
                                                 
5
 We do not intend to provide a comprehensive review of the literature. We focus mainly on studies that 
relate to ours. For example, we do not discuss studies examining the signaling incentive of earnings 
management (e.g., Wahlen 1994; Beaver and Engel 1996).  
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example, Kim and Kross (1998) find that banks with low capital ratios record lower loan 
loss provisions. 
Some banks also have incentives to reduce earnings volatility by decreasing 
earnings in years with unexpectedly strong performance and increasing earnings in years 
with weak performance. A smoother stream of earnings might help reduce the 
information asymmetry between managers and outside investors and avoid potential 
scrutiny from regulators, the SEC, or market participants (Beatty and Harris 1999; Beatty 
et al. 2002; Liu and Ryan 2006). The majority of prior studies (e.g., Collins et al. 1995; 
Schrand and Wong 2003; Kanagaretnam et al. 2004; Liu and Ryan 2006) find evidence 
consistent with managers smoothing earnings via the loan loss provision and recognizing 
security gains and losses.  
Tax expenses represent a significant cost to banks. Prior research also finds that 
banks manage the timing of security gains and losses to reduce the overall tax burden, 
including both state and federal tax (e.g., Beatty et al. 1995; Collins et al. 1995; Beatty 
and Harris 2001). Warfield and Linsmeier (1992) find that the market valuation of 
security gains and losses is consistent with tax management. 
Prior research on earnings management in banks generally does not explicitly 
consider the impact of managers’ personal wealth and we are not aware any study that 
examines the impact of managers’ equity incentives on earnings management in banks. 
This paper addresses this issue, because equity incentives are an important form of 
executive compensation and, as discussed in the next section, prior research examining 
non-regulated industries indicates that equity incentives have an important impact on 
earnings management. 
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Equity Incentives and Earnings Management 
Goldman and Slezak (2006) develop an agency model in which stock-based 
compensation is described as a double-edged sword. It can motivate managers to exert 
productive effort, but at the same time it can also induce managers to divert valuable firm 
resources to misrepresent performance. Option holdings and stock ownership are 
different ways for managers to become owners, thereby mitigating the agency costs 
associated with the separation of ownership and control (Warfield et al. 1995).  However 
these ownership benefits can be dissipated if managers sell shares upon grant or exercise 
of their options. Prior research (Ofek and Yermack 2000; Cheng and Warfield 2005; 
Bergstresser and Philippon 2006) finds that managers with higher equity incentives are 
more likely to sell shares to reduce their exposure to the idiosyncratic risk of the firm. 
Such selling is induced because managers’ wealth is overly sensitive to their firms’ short-
term stock price. This sensitivity can create incentives to engage in earnings management 
in order to increase short-term stock prices and the value of the shares managers plan to 
sell (Jensen 2005).  
Prior research provides evidence supporting the relation between equity incentives 
and earnings management. Using stock-based compensation and stock ownership data 
over the 1993-2000 time period, Cheng and Warfield (2005) document that managers 
with high equity incentives, which include all option and stock holdings, are more likely 
to report earnings that meet or just beat analysts’ forecasts. Using a similar sample period, 
Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) find a positive relation between discretionary accruals 
and equity incentives. 
To summarize, prior research finds that managers with high equity incentives are 
more likely to engage in earnings management relative to those with low equity 
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incentives.6  However, prior research has not examined the equity incentive-earnings 
management relation in financial institutions due to their regulated status and unique 
accounting practices. If the above argument can be extended to the banking industry, we 
expect to find a similar relation between earnings management and equity incentives. 
However, the earnings management effects are likely influenced by potential regulatory 
intervention. While financially strong banks – banks with better performance and higher 
capital – may behave more like firms in non-regulated industries, the behavior of weak 
banks – banks likely subject to regulatory intervention – is affected by potential 
regulatory intervention.7 We next discuss how regulation might affect this relation. 
The Impact of Regulation 
Regulation provides monitoring and disciplining of the management in banks. A 
bank whose balance sheet looks too risky to regulators faces considerable pressure to 
make operational changes and possibly replace management (Demsetz and Lehn 1985). 
Under the capital requirements for banks by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
Improvement Act of 1991 (FDICIA), Tier I capital must exceed 4% of risk-weighted 
assets and total capital must exceed 8% of risk-weighted assets. If a bank’s capital is at or 
below the minimum capital level, the bank cannot issue more deposits or invest in 
additional loans (Ahmed et al. 1999). The response by bank regulators to the sub-prime 
lending crisis, including capital-induced lending constraints, illustrates the importance of 
                                                 
6
 There is also a line of research studying the impact of equity incentives on the likelihood of earnings 
restatements. See Burns and Kedia (2006) and Efendi et al. (2007) for examples. One benefit of examining 
earnings restatements is that it is likely subject to less measurement error problems relative to studies that 
focus on earnings management. The drawback is that inferences from examining restatements are not as 
generalizable compared to those based on broader measures of earnings management.  
7
 Strong banks are not immune to regulation effects. A strong bank can become a weak bank in a general  
economic downturn. Anticipating such outcomes, strong banks might engage in earnings smoothing. 
Indeed, Liu and Ryan (2006) find that banks smooth earnings over business cycles. 
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these regulatory measures.8 
Banks are subject to a stringent regulatory environment. First, banks are subject to 
uniform federal oversight by the Federal Reserve and the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC).9  Second, bank regulators receive quarterly call report data from 
banks and they conduct periodic (surprise) on-site examinations of banks to ensure that 
they comply with various bank regulations. Third, regulators’ examinations go beyond 
the capital requirements; they examine the quality of the investment and loan portfolios 
and the adequacy of loan loss provisions. This last point is especially important in our 
setting, because we use these provisions as our earnings management proxy.  
In this paper, we investigate whether such regulatory monitoring influences equity 
incentive-motivated earnings management. Once regulatory intervention occurs, the 
company’s financial reporting is subject to enhanced scrutiny by regulators, investors, 
and the SEC. Thus, earnings management is more likely to be detected and the 
corresponding cost to managers can be substantial. It thus follows that regulatory 
intervention can deter managers with high equity incentives from engaging in earnings 
management in a sensitive period, when heightened regulatory intervention is probable.10  
Indeed some prior studies suggest that when a firm begins to perform poorly, 
interested parties may increase monitoring of management. In the presence of intense 
monitoring, incentives and opportunities for accruals management may decline. For 
                                                 
8
 The recent takeover of troubled thrift Indymac Bank provides a good illustration of this scenario (Paletta 
et al. 2008).  See also Eavis (2008) and Storey (2008). 
9
 Since 1991, banks have been subject to the provisions of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
Improvement Act (FDICIA - http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c102:S.543.ENR:). FDICIA was 
enacted to address the thrift industry crisis. It recapitalized the Bank Insurance Fund of the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC), expanded the authority of banking regulators to seize undercapitalized 
banks, revised deposit insurance coverage to link the premiums banks pay for FDIC insurance to their 
financial strength, and required bank regulators to intervene in restructuring banks and thrifts that fail to 
meet minimum capital requirements. No such Federal law exists for other industries. 
10
 While there is no literature on direct regulatory actions against management, because regulatory screens 
for increased scrutiny are based on accounting measures that are affected by accounting judgments related 
to loan loss reserves, at a minimum, regulators exercise an indirect monitoring of earnings management. 
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example, DeAngelo et al. (1994) find that managers of troubled companies deliberately 
reduce reported earnings for contractual renegotiations with lenders, unions, government, 
and/or management.  
At the same time, the cost of regulatory scrutiny can also induce managers to 
manage capital or earnings in order to avoid regulatory intervention. Regulatory 
intervention is costly to the companies and particularly to managers. Specifically, the 
potential cost of regulatory intervention to bank CEOs could include (1) lower 
compensation and potentially the loss of their job, (2) decreased value of option/stock 
ownership due to the decrease in stock price.11 Accordingly, managers of regulated 
companies have incentives to exercise discretion over accruals to meet the regulatory 
requirements. In this regard, Ahmed et al. (1999) found that loan loss provisions are used 
for capital management; decreasing loan loss provisions can increase capital ratios as 
well as earnings. Beatty et al. (2002) document that public banks are more likely to 
manage earnings to avoid earnings declines compared to private banks. Liu and Ryan 
(2006) suggest that banks smooth income over the business cycle.12  
These results suggest that accrual manipulation can postpone regulatory 
intervention, sometimes for an extended period. As a result, bank CEOs can possibly 
avoid the cost of regulatory intervention, which likely includes (1) lower compensation 
and/or job security and (2) lower value of their holdings of the bank’s stock and stock-
related assets. While the former is probably independent of the level of equity incentives, 
the latter is a positive function of the size of stock/option portfolio. Thus, CEOs with 
                                                 
11
 For example, if a bank does not maintain enough capital, regulators may limit/curtail lending and/or 
require the bank to raise additional capital.  See Miller (2008) for discussion of the recent example of 
Washington Mutual in this regard. 
12
 Prior research finds similar results in other regulated industries. For example, Gaver and Paterson (2004) 
find insurance firms manage loss reserves to avoid violating the Insurance Regulatory Information System 
(IRIS) ratios that are used by regulators for solvency assessment. 
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higher equity incentives (i.e., more stock and options) stand to lose more in the event of 
regulatory intervention. Even the likelihood of regulator intervention can adversely affect 
the bank’s stock price and the CEOs’ stock/option holdings. As a result, bank CEOs with 
high equity holdings have stronger incentives to manage earnings in order to avoid 
regulatory intervention. 
Due to these opposing forces, the impact of regulatory intervention on earnings 
management arising from equity incentives is ultimately an empirical question. 
Accordingly, our hypothesis is non-directional: 
H1: Earnings management is associated with managers’ equity incentives in 
the banking industry. 
To better capture the impact of regulatory intervention, our second hypothesis 
examines whether the equity incentive / earnings management relation varies with the 
extent of regulatory intervention. Regardless of the direction of the effect of regulatory 
scrutiny, the effect of regulation on equity incentives induced earnings management will 
be stronger when the likelihood of regulatory intervention is higher.13 If regulation 
induces earnings management, we expect to find a more positive, or less negative, 
relation between earnings management and equity incentives. However, if regulation 
mitigates earnings management through increased monitoring, we expect to find a less 
positive relation between earnings management and equity incentives. Given the 
ambiguity of any regulatory effects, the second hypothesis is also non-directional:  
                                                 
13
  As documented below, bank manager equity incentives are smaller relative to other industries. Prior 
bank compensation research documents a relatively weak pay-performance link for banks, which is 
attenuated when bank managers are monitored less (given more discretion). Furthermore, although equity 
incentives are low, banks with higher equity pay do exhibit more risk-seeking behavior (see Crawford et al. 
1995; Houston and James 1995; and Magnan and St-Onge 1997). Thus, as shown in John et al. (2000), 
equity incentives could substitute for regulatory capital based monitoring.  However, such benefits could be 
dissipated by equity incentive induced earnings management. While bank managers may have earnings-
based bonus plans, we do not examine these incentives, because such tests require bonus plan details 
(Healy 1985). We leave the study of bonus effects for future research. 
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H2: The relation between earnings management and equity incentives varies 
depending on the level of regulatory scrutiny. 
 
III. SAMPLE AND DATA 
Table 1 describes the sample selection process. The sample period is constrained 
mainly by the availability of CEO stock-based compensation from ExecuComp and 
industry-specific accrual measures at the time of data collection. The initial sample of 
banks includes all bank-years included in ExecuComp for the period from 1994 to 
2005.14 Requiring data to calculate discretionary loan loss provision, CEO equity 
incentives, and control variables results in a final sample of 600 firm-year observations 
from 81 distinct banks (65 commercial banks and 15 saving institutions). However, our 
sample includes many major banks playing an important role in the U.S. economy, such 
as Bank of America, Wells Fargo, Mellon Financial, Wachovia, and Washington Mutual. 
The samples used in the analyses vary in size due to additional data restrictions. In 
summary, due to data availability of equity incentives, our sample firms are restricted to 
banks that belong to the S&P1500; as a result, our sample banks are larger and more 
profitable than other banks and our results may not be generalized to other banks.  
[Insert Table 1 here] 
Equity incentives  
We consider five equity incentive elements: option grants in the current period, 
unexercisable options, exercisable options, restricted stock grants, and stock ownership. 
We also aggregate these measures together and calculate the total equity incentives. Thus, 
                                                 
14
 As discussed below, our main proxy for earnings management is discretionary loan loss provisions. To 
estimate discretionary loan loss provisions, we need current and one-year ahead change in nonperforming 
assets (NPA). Since NPA is only available since 1993, and up to year 2006 at the time of data collection, 
we can only calculate the necessary changes in NPA for the period 1994-2005. 
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our equity incentive measure is a comprehensive one; it includes, but is not limited to, 
stock-based compensation. Because the potential benefit of increasing short-term stock 
prices, if any, is shared by all shareholders (whether non-CEO shareholders realize it or 
not), the benefit enjoyed by CEOs is thus proportional to the ratio of equity incentive 
measures in shares to total outstanding shares. Accordingly, we deflate all equity 
incentive measures (in shares) by total outstanding shares of the firm. Cheng and 
Warfield (2005) argue that this measurement is appropriate and find that using alternative 
measures leads to the same inferences. 
Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics on CEO equity incentive measures for the 
banks. As indicated in the table, option grants are on average 0.141 percent of 
outstanding shares. Unexercisable options (excluding option grants) average 0.121 
percent. Exercisable options average 0.548 percent. Ownership averages 1.045 percent. 
As in other industries in this time period, the mean restricted stock grant is small, only 
0.011 percent, and the median is zero. The sum of all these elements, total equity 
incentive, is on average 1.88 percent and has a median of 0.89 percent.  
[Insert Table 2 here] 
Panel B of Table 2 reports correlations between equity incentive measures. Option 
grants are significantly correlated with exercisable options and stock ownership. 
Unexercisable options and exercisable options are significantly positively correlated with 
each other and with ownership. These significant correlations indicate the importance of 
including all elements of equity incentives in the analyses; otherwise, the inferences on a 
specific element (such as the occurrence of option grants) might be biased.15 
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 In a sensitivity test, we investigate the impact of individual components of equity incentives. The results 
are consistent with the main results but generally weaker. This is likely driven by the smaller variation in 
individual components compared to total equity incentives.  
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Earnings Management Measure: Discretionary Loan Loss Provision 
Following prior research, we measure the extent of earnings management in banks 
using discretionary loan loss provision.16 Specifically, as in Beaver and Engel (1996), we 
use the residual from the following regression model as an estimate of the discretionary 
component of the loan loss provision (LLP):  
titititititti zNPANPALOANCOGBVPLL ,1,4,3,2,10, )/1( +∆+∆+∆++= +γγγγγ
, 
where GBVt is net book value of common equity plus total allowance for loan losses; COt 
is loan charge-offs; ∆LOANt is change in total loans (LOANt-LOANt-1); ∆NPAi,t is the 
most recent change in nonperforming assets (NPAt-NPAt-1); and ∆NPAi,t+1 is one-period-
ahead change in nonperforming assets. All variables are deflated by GBVt. These factors 
have been shown to affect the level of loan loss provision (e.g., Beaver and Engel 1996).  
Specifically, current net charge-offs can provide information about future net 
charge-offs, which can then affect expectations of the collectibility of current loans. The 
level of nonperforming assets is an indicator of default risk. Naturally, the magnitude of 
uncollectable loans increases with the size of loans outstanding. Since the provision is an 
expense for a period of time, the changes of loans and nonperforming assets are included 
instead of the level variables. One-year-ahead change in nonperforming assets is used to 
proxy for information that management has as of year t about the default exposure of 
loans that is not reflected in the other explanatory variables.  
Table 3, Panel A presents results of the regression used to estimate discretionary 
loan loss provision (DLLP). The regression is estimated using all banks with required 
data from Bank Compustat and Compustat North America-industry annual file in the 
                                                 
16
 While the allowance has a direct impact on the capital level, which affects whether a bank is subject to 
potential regulatory scrutiny, loan loss provisions are more subject to management discretion than other 
components of allowance (e.g., beginning balance, loan charge offs). 
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period of 1994 to 2005. We use all banks with data in the estimation period to mitigate 
any effects arising from our sample selection, particularly the requirement on CEO equity 
incentives. In a sensitivity tests, we also estimate DLLP using our sample only and the 
results are qualitatively similar. The regression results are consistent with those in Beaver 
and Engel (1996).  
Panel B reports descriptive statistics on DLLP. Negative (positive) DLLP implies 
upward (downward) earnings management. While both the mean and median of DLLP 
are very small by construction, the cross-sectional variation is substantial: loan loss 
provision as a percent of equity is understated by 0.57 percent at the 25th percentile but 
overstated by 0.35 percent at the 75th percentile.  
Proxies for Potential Regulatory Intervention 
Following prior research, we use the level of capital ratio to capture the likelihood 
of regulatory intervention in banks. We obtain the risk-adjusted capital ratio-tier 1 
(CAP_Tier1) and the risk-adjusted capital ratio-total (CAP_Total) from Compustat.17 Not 
surprisingly, the capital ratios in the sample are all above the regulatory minimums 
requirement: the minimum CAP_Tier1 in our sample is 5.22% and minimum CAP_Total 
is 8.50%. The mean and median of CAP_Tier1 are 9.93 percent and 9.39 percent, and the 
mean and median of CAP_Total are 13.26 percent and 12.43 percent. We construct a 
dummy variable, DCAP, to indicate whether a bank is close to regulatory intervention for 
tests of H2: If the capital ratio is in the bottom quartile of the sample, we assign DCAP to 
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 Tier 1 capital includes book value of equity, qualifying non-cumulative perpetual preferred stock, and 
minority interest in equity accounts of subsidiaries (net of goodwill and other intangible assets). Total 
capital further includes loan loss reserves, perpetual preferred stock, hybrid capital instruments, perpetual 
debt, mandatory convertible debt securities, term subordinated debt, and intermediate preferred stock.  
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be 1; otherwise DCAP is zero.18 (The first quartile of CAP_Tier1 and CAP_Total in the 
sample is 8.01 percent and 11.39 percent.) In the main analyses, we use Tier 1 capital 
ratio and in a sensitivity test, we use the total capital ratio to construct the DCAP dummy 
variable.19 
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
We first report the overall association between equity incentives and earnings 
management (H1) and then report the impact of potential regulatory intervention on the 
association of equity incentives and earnings management (H2). We continue with a 
discussion of additional tests and potential alternative explanations. 
Equity Incentives and Earnings management 
To test H1, we regress discretionary loan loss provisions on equity incentives and 
control variables, as follows: 
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Negative (positive) coefficients on equity incentive measures indicate that bank managers 
with high equity incentives engage in upward (downward) earnings management. We 
include income before tax and loan loss provision (EBTP), risk-adjusted tier-1 capital 
ratio (CAP_Tier1), firm size (Size), and tax (Tax) in the regression. These variables are 
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 We also define DCAP based on the yearly distribution of CAP_Tier1 and find similar results. One 
disadvantage of this approach is that the sample size is small in some years. Also, regulators and investors 
likely use several years’ data to evaluate whether a bank is “close” to the capital requirement; the overall 
sample distribution is good proxy for the historical distribution. The capital requirement did not change in 
our sample period.  
19
 After 1990, loan loss reserve is not part of Tier 1 capital. Thus, a reduction of loan loss provision can 
increase earnings and Tier 1 capital by the after-tax amount of the reduction. Since loan loss reserve is still 
part of total capital, a one dollar reduction of loan loss provision reduces total capital by the tax rate times 
one dollar. See Ahmed et al. (1999) and Kim and Kross (1998) for more details. Given the opposite impact 
of loan loss provision changes on Tier 1 capital ratio and total capital ratios, we use Tier 1 capital ratio in 
the main tests and total capital ratio in a sensitivity test.    
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used to control for other incentives for discretionary behavior in loan loss provision 
reporting, as identified in prior research: to smooth reported earnings, to satisfy 
regulatory capital requirements, and to minimize taxes (Ahmed et al. 1999; Collins et al. 
1995; Liu and Ryan 2006; Moyer 1990).20 
The Appendix describes variable measurements, and Panel B of Table 3 provides 
the descriptive statistics, of these control variables. As shown in the table, the sample 
bank-years have on average earnings before tax and provisions of 23.6 percent of total 
assets, Tier1 capital of 9.9% of total assets. On average, the sample banks are quite large, 
with an average market value of $10 billion and a median of $2.3 billion. The average tax 
rate is 33.6%. Panel C provides descriptive statistics separately for banks with DCAP=1 
and with DCAP=0. Compared to other banks, banks that are more likely to be subject to 
regulatory intervention have slightly lower levels of DLLP, similar performance, 
significantly lower Tier 1 capital ratio by construction, surprisingly high market value 
(and total assets) and higher tax rate, and similar equity incentives. 
Panel D of Table 3 reports the correlation between discretionary loan loss provision, 
total equity incentives, and the control variables. As expected, DLLP is positively 
correlated with performance, capital requirement, and firm size. DLLP is marginally 
significantly correlated with total equity incentives and tax status. Equity incentives are 
lower for firms with better performance and larger size, and are higher for firms with 
more capital. Some of the correlations between control variables are significant, but none 
of them appears large enough to present collinearity problems. 
                                                 
20
 The results on variables of interest are the same when we control for year fixed effects and when we add 
non-linear terms of capital ratios. 
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Column (1) of Panel A of Table 4 reports the regression results of equation (1).21 As 
indicated in the table, the coefficient on total equity incentives is not significantly 
different from zero. The coefficient is negative and the two sided p-value is 0.890. This 
implies that overall bank CEOs with high equity incentives are not more likely to manage 
earnings upward than those with low equity incentives. This insignificant result might be 
due to the conflicting effects of regulatory intervention on earnings management, as 
discussed earlier, and/or earnings management arising from equity incentives is not 
strong in the banking industry.  
 [Insert Table 4] 
Control variables are in general significantly related to discretionary loan loss 
provisions. Banks with more net income before tax and loan loss provision tend to 
overstate loan loss provision, consistent with an earnings smoothing story. The capital 
requirement is not significantly correlated with DLLP. This result is different from that in 
prior research. Further investigation suggests that this is due to differences in samples. As 
mentioned above, our banks are relatively large due to the data requirement of equity 
incentives. When we estimate equation (1) without including equity incentives using all 
banks with data available, we find that banks with low capital ratios have lower 
discretionary loan loss provision (not tabulated). Inconsistent with the tax minimization 
prediction, we find banks which pay tax understate loan loss provision. Larger banks 
have lower discretionary loan loss provision. 
To summarize, we find that unlike their counterparts in other industries, bank CEOs 
with higher equity incentives are not more likely to engage in upward earnings 
management. These results highlight the importance of examining regulated industries, 
                                                 
21
 The results are very similar if we use White-t statistics or if we use the Fama-MacBeth (1973) approach. 
Also, throughout the analyses, we exclude observations with student-t greater than 3. Not excluding outliers 
leads to similar results.  
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because non-regulated industry results may not generalize into regulated industries, 
possibly due to variation in the effect of regulation. Alternatively, the lack of significant 
results might due to the lack of power in the test. To distinguish between regulation and 
lack of power effects, below we examine whether firms that are more likely subject to 
regulatory intervention have different earnings management behavior from other banks.  
The Impact of Potential Regulatory Intervention on the Extent of Earnings 
Management Arising from Equity Incentives 
As discussed above, the relation between earnings management and equity incentives 
might be stronger for banks with relatively low capital ratios – banks subject to potential 
regulatory intervention. If regulation induces earnings management, CEOs with equity 
incentives might want to engage in upward earnings management to avoid regulatory 
intervention. On the other hand, the relation can be weaker for these banks if the potential 
regulatory attention deters earnings management, by increasing the likelihood of 
detecting earnings management practices. To capture this effect, we add an interaction of 
equity incentives (EI) and low capital ratio dummy (DCAP) based on risk-adjusted Tier1 
capital to regression (1): 
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With this specification, the coefficient on EI, β0, now captures the impact of equity 
incentive for banks with high capital ratios, and the coefficient on the interaction term, β2, 
captures the incremental impact of equity incentives for banks with low capital ratios. A 
negative coefficient on the interaction term indicates that regulation strengthens the 
earnings management incentive arising from equity incentives; a positive coefficient 
indicates that regulation weakens the earnings management incentive. 
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Column (2) in Panel A of Table 4 reports the regression results. The coefficient on 
the interaction of equity incentives and the low capital ratio dummy, DCAP, is 
significantly negative, suggesting that the relation between equity incentives and earnings 
management is more negative for banks that have relatively low capital ratios compared 
to other banks. Since a negative correlation indicates upward earnings management, this 
result indicates that equity incentives are more likely to induce upward earnings 
management when banks are closer to capital ratio requirement violations.  
The bottom of the table presents the net relation between equity incentives and 
earnings management for banks with low capital ratios. While the association between 
total equity incentives and loan loss provision is significantly positive for banks with 
relatively high capital ratios, it is significantly negative for banks with relatively low 
capital ratios. This suggests that equity incentives induce downward earnings 
management in banks with relatively high capital ratios, but upward earnings 
management in banks with relatively low capital ratios. That is, bank managers with high 
equity incentives appear to be conservative in accounting estimates when capital ratios 
are high, but they are more likely to manage earnings upward in bad times, possibly to 
avoid regulatory intervention. These opposite effects lead to an insignificant relation for 
the full sample as reported in Column (1) of Table 4, Panel A. 
Another interesting result is that DCAP has a significantly positive coefficient, 
indicating that banks with low equity incentives are more conservative in financial 
reporting when they are subject to regulator intervention. This result is similar to that in 
DeAngelo et al. (1994), who find that managers of troubled companies deliberately 
reduce reported earnings for contractual renegotiations with lenders, unions, government, 
and/or management. However, the significant negative coefficient on the interaction term 
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indicates the response to potential regulatory intervention changes with CEO equity 
incentives: they become more aggressive, or at least less conservative, when equity 
incentives and regulatory scrutiny are high.  
To formally test the impact of potential regulatory intervention on the earnings 
management in banks with different levels of equity incentives, we use decile ranks of 
equity incentives with value between 0 and 1, rather than the raw measures, and re-
estimate equation (2) in column (3) of Panel A in Table 4. The coefficient on DCAP thus 
captures the impact of DCAP on DLLP when total equity incentives are in the bottom 
decile. A positive coefficient (0.420, p=0.007) indicates that for banks with lower equity 
incentives , those close to regulatory intervention have higher loan loss provision than 
those that are not close to regulatory intervention. The sum of the coefficients on DCAP 
and on EI x DCAP capture the effect of DCAP on DLLP for banks with equity incentives 
in the top decile (when ranked EI=1). As shown in the bottom of the table, the impact of 
DCAP is significantly negative for banks with equity incentives in the top decile. The 
sum of the coefficients is -0.497, which is significantly different zero at the 0.005 level. 
This suggests that when bank CEOs have high equity incentives, they are more likely to 
manage earnings upward when the capital ratio is low, exactly opposite to the behavior of 
bank CEOs with low equity incentives in the same situation (low capital ratio). 
We hypothesize that bank managers reduce loan loss provisions to increase earnings 
and thus reduce the likelihood of regulatory intervention. Presumably, the level of 
earnings performance can affect the results documented above. To check whether this is 
the case, we add interaction between earnings performance variable (EBTP) with the 
interaction term between equity incentives and DCAP to equation (2). We also add the 
interaction between EBTP and both equity incentives and DCAP.  
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We report the results in Panel B of Table 4 (Column (1) with raw measures of 
equity incentives (EI) and Column (2) with decile ranks of equity incentives). The 
coefficient on EBTP×EI×DCAP is significantly positive in both regressions, indicating 
the negative impact of EI×DCAP on DLLP is weaker when earnings are higher, or 
stronger when earnings are lower. That is, the regression results confirm the above 
conjecture: the incentive to decrease the loan loss provision in case of high equity 
incentives and potential regulatory intervention is stronger for banks with poor earnings 
performance and weaker for banks with strong earnings performance.22  
Overall, the association between equity incentives and earnings management is 
enhanced in banks by potential regulatory intervention, indicating a stronger incentive to 
avoid such intervention. While regulation may be designed to monitor weak banks and 
protect depositors, investors, and the banking system, it may also introduce incentives for 
managers to engage in earnings management to avoid such regulatory intervention. Our 
analyses indicate that the bank managers’ incentives to engage in upward earnings 
management are strong only when both of the following two conditions are satisfied: (1) 
bank CEOs have high equity incentives so that their personal welfare is more strongly 
correlated with bank performance and (2) the capital ratio is close to regulatory minimum. 
V. Additional and sensitivity analyses 
Equity Incentives, Future Trading, and Earnings Management 
Future insider trading has been identified as the underlying link between equity 
incentives and earnings management in other industries (e.g., Cheng and Warfield 2005; 
Bergstresser and Philippon 2006). In this section, we investigate whether future insider 
                                                 
22
 Our controls for performance and the related interaction variables should also address the concern that 
the documented results are driven by any potential relation between equity incentives and bank 
performance.  
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trading serves a similar role in our setting. Specifically, we investigate whether future 
insider trading increases with CEO equity incentives in the banking industry and whether 
earnings management varies with future insider trading, which can be considered an ex-
post measure of managers’ incentives to manage earnings and to increase stock prices.  
We collect executive trading data from the SEC ownership reporting system data 
file (Form 3, 4, 5). Following prior research (e.g., Ke et al. 2003), we regard individuals 
with titles “Chairman of board,” “CEO,” “President” as CEOs, and we measure CEO 
trading as net sales: 
Net sales = Open market sales - (Open market purchases + Options exercised) 
We scale net sales in dollars by the firm’s market value at the end of fiscal year t.23  
We investigate CEOs’ net sales in the year after earnings announcement. Net sales, 
on average, are approximately $1.763 million and represent about 0.068 percent of the 
firm’s market value for bank-years with CEO trading transactions. We assume net sales 
to be zero for bank-years without CEO trading transactions. We exclude five 
observations with missing earnings announcement dates; this assumption is appropriate to 
the extent that the coverage of the database is complete. In a sensitivity test, we include 
these five observations assuming that their earnings announcement dates are three months 
after the fiscal year end, and obtain similar results.  
We use the following equation to examine the relationship between equity 
incentives (EI) and future trading (NetSale): 
1,,3,2,1,01, Retβ ++ +++++= titititititi GrowthSizeEINetSale ξγγγγ   (3) 
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 The deflated net sale measure is a function of (1) the ratio of net sales in shares to total outstanding 
shares, and (2) stock returns from trading dates to the fiscal year end. Thus, using the market value as the 
deflator is consistent with using outstanding shares to scale equity incentives. Using logarithm 
transformations does not affect the inferences. 
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Variable measurements are described in the Appendix. If more equity incentives lead to 
increases in future sales by managers, then we expect to observe positive coefficients on 
EI. We include several control variables that might affect future insider selling in the 
regression so that β captures the relation between equity incentives and “abnormal” 
selling. Lakonishok and Lee (2001) find that insiders in large firms sell more shares, 
although in a smaller proportion to market value. Rozeff and Zaman (1998) find that 
insiders in growth firms sell more shares. Prior returns are included to control for 
contrarian trading behavior by insiders; insiders tend to sell more shares after high stock 
returns (Lakonishok and Lee 2001).  
The regression results are reported in Panel A of Table 5. Consistent with results for 
other industries, we find that total equity incentives exhibit a significant and positive 
coefficient, suggesting that bank CEOs with high equity incentives are more likely to sell 
in the next year. More importantly, however, when we introduce the regulation effect by 
adding DCAP and its interaction term with equity incentives, we find that this positive 
relation is driven by banks with low capital ratios. That is, for banks with low capital 
ratios, net selling is positively correlated with equity incentives (p=0.001), as reported in 
the bottom of the table, but the relation is not significant for banks with high capital ratios 
(p=0.309). This insider trading result fits well with the earnings management results 
reported in Table 4.  
[Insert Table 5 here] 
The results on control variables are similar to those in prior research. Size has a 
significantly negative coefficient in one specification, but not in the other. The coefficient 
on Growth (book to market ratio) is significantly negative as expected. Stock return has 
positive significant coefficients in both regressions, suggesting that insiders tend to sell 
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more shares after high stock returns. 
Overall, these results suggest that equity incentives lead to future trading, although 
only when the capital ratio is low, and this trading is likely the fundamental reason for 
earnings management. Since as researchers, we cannot observe net sales ex ante, we use 
equity incentives to capture this effect. However, bank CEOs likely know the magnitude 
of the selling and prepare financial reporting accordingly. Although the ex post measure 
of net sales capture managers’ ex ante incentive with error, as the ultimate transaction 
price might change, we investigate whether net sales are correlated with earnings 
management.  
To this end, we replace equity incentives in equations (1) and (2) with net sales and 
report the results in Panel B of Table 5. We find that NetSale is significantly and 
negatively correlated with DLLP, implying that managers who sell most shares in the 
future are more likely to understate loan loss provisions in order to increase reported 
earnings. Consistent with the results above, we find that this result is driven by banks 
with low capital ratios. When we examine regulation effects in column (2), we find that 
NetSale is insignificantly correlated with DLLP for banks with high capital ratios, but 
NetSale×DCAP has a negative coefficient. The bottom of the table reports the net effect 
of net sales for banks with low capital ratios: the net effect is negative and significant at 
the 0.033 level. That is, when the capital ratio is low and potential regulatory intervention 
is high, bank CEOs who are going to sell more are taking less loan loss provision than 
their counterparts expected to sell less. (Due to the negative correlation between the 
coefficient on NetSale and NetSale ×DCAP, the net effect is significant although neither 
of the two variables have coefficients significantly different from zero.) 
In sum, combined with results reported in Table 4, results in Table 5 indicate that 
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when the capital ratio is low, bank CEOs with high equity incentives are more likely to 
sell in order to reduce their exposure to the potential regulatory intervention, and this 
induces earnings management. When the capital ratio is high, bank CEOs with high 
equity incentives do not exhibit strong selling behavior and, as a result, do not manage 
earnings upward.  
Using the Absolute Value of DLLP 
In this section, we examine both the earnings management and subsequent selling 
tests, with the earnings management variable defined as the absolute value of LLP 
(|DLLP|).  These tests are motivated by the possibility of downward earnings 
management, possibly to accomplish earnings smoothing.  The results are reported in 
Table 6.  
[Insert Table 6 here] 
In model 1, we re-examine the relationship between equity incentives and earnings 
management (either upward or downward adjustments to LLP), and conditional on 
regulatory capital levels.  Consistent with the earlier reported results, equity incentives 
and |DLLP| are positively correlated (albeit at a marginal significance level). Furthermore, 
the bank capital interaction results indicate that the earnings management incentives are 
strongest for banks with low capital ratios. For model 2, while NetSale is not correlated 
with |DLLP| for banks with high capital ratios, the relation is significantly positive for 
banks with low capital ratios.  This result is consistent with the signed DLLP tests: 
earnings management appears in banks with low capital ratios, not for banks with 
stronger capital. Thus, these follow-up analyses corroborate the earlier reported results 
and support earnings management incentives in these regulated companies, especially for 
those most subject to regulatory scrutiny (low capital ratios).  
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Sensitivity Tests 
We conduct a series of sensitivity tests to ensure that our results are robust.  
Alternative proxies for potential regulatory attention 
We examine whether the results of H2 are sensitive to alternative proxies for 
potential regulatory attention. Specifically, we define the indicator variable, DCAP, in 
two alternative ways. First, we use a size-based CAP_Tier1 ratio to construct this dummy 
variable. Specifically, we rank all observations based on firm size and split the sample 
into three groups based on size. We then assign the dummy variable to be one for 
observations with CAP_Tier1 in the bottom quartile within each size group, and zero 
otherwise. The creation of this variable controls for size effect; some might argue that 
large banks are “too big to fail” and the same capital ratio may imply different regulatory 
intervention for large banks than for small banks. Second, we define the indicator 
variable based on total risk-adjusted capital ratio. Table 7 reports the regression results 
based on these alternative proxies. The inferences are similar to those reported in Table 4: 
bank managers with high equity incentives are more likely to manage earnings (and 
capital) upward when potential regulatory attention is high.  
[Insert Table 7 here] 
Alternative proxies for earnings management 
In a sensitivity test, we use discretionary allowance for loan loss as the proxy for 
earnings management and reexamine H1 and H2. Discretionary allowance for loan loss is 
large in magnitude and it is subject to managers’ discretion due to the uncertainty around 
the estimation of loan losses and the inherent discretion in the accounting for the 
allowance (Beaver and Engel 1996). Based on untabulated tests, we find the results are 
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robust to this measure.24  
Similar to Beatty et al. (2002), we also examined the use of discretionary realized 
security gains and losses (RSGL), as an earnings management proxy (both signed and in 
absolute value). In general the results for these tests are not significant at conventional 
levels. These weaker results may be expected given the loss of approximately 20 percent 
of the bank-year observations due to additional data constraints and the smaller 
magnitude of RSGL relative to LLP. In the subsample for which we have data on RSGL, 
the Q1-Q3 range for RSGL is 0.043 percent (of total assets) and the range for 
discretionary RSGL is 0.063%. In contrast, the Q1-Q3 range for discretionary loan loss 
provision is 0.926%, almost 15 times that of discretionary RSGL.  
Alternative explanation for the results 
An alternative explanation for the difference in the results between banks subject to 
potential regulatory intervention and other banks is that they might have different levels 
of equity incentives. For example, it is likely that banks with low capital ratios have 
higher CEO equity incentives than those with high capital ratios, leading to a significant 
coefficient on equity incentives for the former but an insignificant coefficient for the 
latter.   
To investigate the validity of this alternative explanation, we compare the total 
equity incentives between firms subject to potential regulatory intervention and those 
which are not. We find that the mean of total equity incentives of banks with low capital 
ratios is 1.93 percent, and the mean of total equity incentives of banks with high capital 
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 We do not use this measure in the main test as we feel an income statement item based measure (i.e., 
discretionary loan loss provision) is better for capturing the earnings management behavior in a particular 
period, while the balance sheet based measure (i.e., discretionary allowance for loan loss) captures the 
accumulated earnings management up to the particular period. The former is better aligned with our 
theoretical argument.  
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ratio is 1.87 percent. The difference in the mean, 0.06, is not significantly different from 
zero. These insignificant differences in mean equity incentives suggest that the 
differences in earnings management behavior between firms subject to different levels of 
regulatory intervention is not due to different level of equity incentives, but due to the 
impact of regulatory intervention.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we examine the relationship between equity incentives and earnings 
management in a regulated industry – the banking industry. Prior studies of the relation 
between equity incentives and earnings management generally exclude financial 
institutions because managers in these industries may have different motivations to 
manage earnings due to regulation or other factors. Our research addresses this omission 
and provides insights into the effects of regulatory intervention on earnings management 
arising from equity incentives. Moreover, the more reliable measures of management’s 
exercise of discretion over earnings can address the concern that the findings in prior 
studies are subject to bias arising from measurement errors. 
We find that on average bank managers with high equity incentives are not more 
likely to manage earnings upward, but we find a positive association between equity 
incentives and upward earnings management in banks with potential regulatory 
intervention, indicating a stronger incentive to avoid such intervention through earnings 
management. As in other industries, the underlying link between equity incentives and 
earnings management is future trading. We find that bank managers with higher equity 
incentives are more likely to sell in the next year and that this positive relation is 
primarily driven by banks with low capital ratios. When we directly link CEOs’ future 
selling behavior to earnings management, we find a positive relation between earnings 
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management and future sales for banks with low capital ratios. In contrast, bank CEOs 
with high equity incentives and lower regulatory scrutiny do not exhibit strong selling 
behavior and, as a result, do not manage earnings upward. 
Overall, our findings highlight the complexity of the interaction between regulation, 
equity incentives, and earnings management, as well as the unintended consequences of 
regulatory intervention. Managers have incentives to engage in upward earnings 
management when they have high equity incentives and when potential regulatory 
intervention is high. While regulation may be intended to monitor weak firms and protect 
investors, depositors, and other stakeholders, such regulation may introduce incentives 
for managers to engage in earnings management to avoid such regulatory intervention, 
particularly when executives with significant wealth tied up to the company’s stock price.  
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APPENDIX 
Variable Measurement 
A. Equity incentives 
EIi,t is the sum of unexercisable options (including option grants), exercisable options, and ownership; it is 
measured in shares at the end of fiscal year t, scaled by the number of outstanding shares; we do not include 
restricted stock grants since they are very small. 
 
B. Discretionary loan loss provision 
LLP
 i,t  = provision for loan losses; 
GBVi,t = net book value of common equity, plus total allowance for loan losses; 
COi,t = loan charge-offs; 
∆ LOANi,t = change in total loans (i.e., LOANi,t-LOANi,t-1); 
∆NPAi,t = change in nonperforming assets (i.e., NPAt-NPAt-1); 
∆NPAi,t+1 = one-period-ahead change in nonperforming assets (i.e., NPAt+1-NPAt); 
DLLPi,t = discretionary provision for loan losses scaled by GBV, in percent; 
 
C. Capital Ratios 
CAP_Tier 1i,t = risk-adjusted capital ratio – tier 1; 
CAP_Totali,t = risk-adjusted capital ratio – total; 
DCAPi,t = 1 if CAP_Tier 1i,t is in the bottom quartile of the sample, and 0 otherwise; 
 
D. Factors affecting discretionary loan loss provision 
EBTPi,t = net income before tax and loan loss provision; 
Sizei,t = natural logarithm of market value (in million dollars) at the end of fiscal year t; 
Taxi,t = income tax expense, divided by net income before tax; 
 
E. Future net sales 
NetSalei,t+1   = CEO’s net sales (in dollars) in the year after the earnings announcement for fiscal year t, 
scaled by the market value at the end of fiscal year t, where net sales = open market sales - (open market 
purchases + options exercised); 
 
F. Factors affecting future net sales 
Sizei,t   = natural logarithm of market value (in million dollars) at the end of fiscal year t; 
Growthi,t = the book-to-market ratio at the end of fiscal year t; 
Reti,t   = buy and hold raw return in the 12 months prior to the earnings announcement for fiscal year t. 
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Table 1 Sample Selection 
 
This table describes the sample selection process for the sample used to test the relation between 
earnings management and equity incentives.  
 
 Observations 
Initial sample with data on CEO equity incentives from ExecuComp in the 
period 1994-2005 with the following SIC codes: 6020, 6035, 6036 * 1177 
Less:  
Bank-years with missing components of equity incentives 69 
Bank-years not covered in Bank Compustat 446 
Bank-years with missing control variables (capital ratios, EBTP, size, tax)          62 
 
Final sample used in the analyses 600 
 
* These are the SIC codes covered in Bank Compustat. Bank Compustat also covers SIC codes 
6021, 6022, and 6311, but ExecuComp does not have firms in these industries.  
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TABLE 2  
Descriptive Statistics - Equity Incentives  
 
The descriptive statistics are based on 600 bank-years with data available for equity incentives 
and discretionary loan loss provisions in the period 1994-2005. Equity incentive measures (in 
shares) are scaled by total outstanding shares of the firm. 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics on CEOs’ equity incentives 
  Mean Std. Q1 Median Q3 
Option grants (%) 0.141 0.220 0.021 0.070 0.145 
Unexercisable options (excluding option grants) (%) 0.121 0.345 0.000 0.050 0.139 
Exercisable options (%) 0.548 0.711 0.105 0.286 0.645 
Restricted stock grants (%) 0.011 0.035 0.000 0.000 0.007 
Ownership (%) 1.045 1.723 0.112 0.321 1.265 
 
Total equity incentives (EI) (%) 1.883 2.414 0.396 0.893 2.617 
 
Panel B: Spearman and Pearson correlations between equity incentive measures 
The lower triangle reports Spearman correlations and the upper triangle reports Pearson 
correlations. 
  
Option 
grants 
Unexercisable 
options (excluding 
option grants) 
Exercisable 
options Ownership 
Total 
equity 
incentives 
Option grants  0.033 0.431 0.319 0.457 
  (0.415) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Unexercisable options  
(excluding option grants) 0.045  0.130 0.143 0.280 
 (0.274)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
 
Exercisable options  0.480 0.162  0.417 0.665 
 (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) 
 
Ownership 0.315 0.104 0.490  0.937 
   (0.001) (0.011) (0.001)  (0.001) 
 
Total equity incentives 0.446 0.229 0.697 0.919  
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  
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TABLE 3  
Descriptive Statistics - Discretionary Loan Loss Provision and Control Variables 
 
Panel A reports the results of regression used to estimate discretionary loan loss provision. Panels 
B and C report descriptive statistics of the 600 firm-years with data on equity incentives and 
discretionary loan loss provisions in the period 1994-2005. Please see the Appendix for variable 
measurement.  
 
Panel A: Estimation of discretionary loan loss provision (DLLP) 
DLLP refers to the residual of the following regression: 
titititititti zNPANPALOANCOGBVLLP ,1,4,3,2,10, )/1( +∆+∆+∆++= +γγγγγ . 
Please see the Appendix for variable measurement. All variables are deflated by GBVt. The 
regression is estimated using all banks with required data from Bank Compustat and Compustat 
North America-industry annual in the period of 1994 to 2005. There are 4,962 number of 
observations and the adjusted R-square is 0.853.   
 
tGBV/1  tiCO ,  tiLOAN ,∆  tiNPA ,∆  1, +∆ tiNPA  
Coefficients 0.097 1.006 0.005 0.080 0.017 
t-statistics 12.36 135.53 27.15 15.76 3.65 
 
Panel B: Descriptive statistics of DLLP and control variables  
  Mean Std. Q1 Median Q3 
DLLP (%) -0.096 1.198 -0.573 -0.087 0.353 
EBTP 0.236 0.066 0.191 0.235 0.277 
CAP_Tier1 9.927 3.163 8.005 9.385 11.300 
Market value (in millions) 10,030 21,584 975 2,303 9,339 
Size (log of market value) 8.015 1.472 6.882 7.742 9.142 
Tax 0.336 0.047 0.318 0.339 0.360 
 
Panel C: Descriptive statistics by DCAP 
 
Financially weak banks 
(banks with DCAP=1) 
 
Financially strong banks 
(banks with DCAP=0) 
 
  Mean Median  Mean Median  
t-stat for  
the difference  
in means 
DLLP (%) -0.219 -0.217  -0.055 -0.067  -1.45 
EBTP 0.237 0.232  0.235 0.236  0.30 
CAP_Tier1 7.077 7.235  10.877 10.235  -14.91 
Market value (in millions) 13,036 4,747  9,029 2,060  1.97 
Size (log of market value) 8.374 8.465  7.895 7.631  3.49 
Tax 0.354 0.348  0.331 0.335  5.31 
Total equity incentives (%) 1.930 0.707  1.867 0.945  0.28 
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TABLE 3 (cont’d) 
 
Panel D: Spearman and Pearson correlation between variables used in correlation 
The lower triangle reports Spearman correlations and the upper triangle reports Pearson 
correlations. 
 
  DLLP 
Total equity 
incentives EBTP 
 
CAP_Tier1 
 
Size 
 
Tax 
DLLP  0.047 0.255 0.020 -0.099 -0.120 
  (0.246) (0.001) (0.621) (0.015) (0.003) 
Total equity 
incentives 0.066  0.035 0.033 -0.427 0.025 
 (0.105)  (0.388) (0.413) (0.001) (0.536) 
EBTP 0.279 -0.095  -0.102 0.202 -0.061 
 (0.001) (0.020)  (0.012) (0.001) (0.134) 
CAP_Tier1 0.109 0.152 -0.040  -0.287 -0.087 
 (0.008) (0.001) (0.329)  (0.001) (0.033) 
Size -0.120 -0.556 0.225 -0.318  -0.149 
 (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) 
Tax -0.086 0.125 -0.008 -0.164 -0.170  
 (0.035) (0.002) (0.853) (0.001) (0.001)  
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TABLE 4  
Equity Incentives and Earnings Management 
 
This table reports the coefficients and the accompanying p-value of the following regression: 
tititititi
titi
TaxSizeTierCAPEBTP
EIDLLP
,,4,3,2,1
,0,
1
β
ςγγγγ
γ
+++++
+=
−
    (1) 
tititititi
titititi
TaxSizeTierCAPEBTP
DCAPEIDCAPEIDLLP
,,4,3,2,1
,,21,00,
1
βββ
ςγγγγ
γ
+++++
×+++=
−
   (2) 
DLLP is in percent. This regression is estimated using 600 firm-years with data available for 
equity incentives and discretionary loan loss provisions in the period 1994-2005. The p-value in 
parentheses is based on two-sided t-tests. Please refer to the Appendix for variable measurement. 
Column (3) uses the decile ranks of EI standardized to the range [0,1]. 
 
Panel A reports results from the regression estimation of equations (1) and (2). Panel B reports 
the results after adding to equation (2) the interaction terms between EBTP and three variables: 
EI, DCAP, and EI and DCAP.  
 
Panel A: Tests of H1 and H2 
 
  
Overall effect 
of equity 
incentives (EI) 
(1) 
The effect of EI 
conditional on DCAP 
- using raw measure of EI 
(2) 
The effect of EI 
conditional on DCAP 
- using decile ranks of EI 
(3) 
Intercept 0.825 1.090 1.137 
 (0.072) (0.018) (0.022) 
Total Equity Incentives (EI) -0.004 0.038 0.167 
 (0.838) (0.046) (0.289) 
DCAP  0.246 0.420 
  (0.037) (0.007) 
EI × DCAP  -0.178 -0.917 
  (0.001) (0.001) 
EBTP 4.301 3.835 3.853 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
CAP_Tier 1 0.000 -0.012 -0.012 
 (0.986) (0.391) (0.410) 
Size -0.143 -0.162 -0.160 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Tax -2.387 -2.209 -2.472 
 (0.003) (0.007) (0.003) 
N 584 585 586 
Adj. R2 0.116 0.135 0.117 
Net effect of Equity Incentives for banks with low capital ratio 
20 ββ +   
 -0.139 
(0.001) 
-0.750 
(0.002) 
Net effect of DCAP for banks with high equity incentives 
21 ββ +   
  -0.497 
(0.005) 
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TABLE 4 (cont’d) 
 
Panel B: Analyses conditional on firm performance 
 
  
The effect of EI conditional 
on DCAP 
- using raw measure of EI 
The effect of EI conditional on 
DCAP 
- using decile ranks of EI 
Intercept 1.185 0.978 
 (0.012) (0.063) 
Total Equity Incentives (EI) 0.214 1.378 
 (0.001) (0.015) 
DCAP 0.469 1.456 
 (0.279) (0.017) 
EI  × DCAP -0.501 -3.507 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
EBTP 4.842 6.074 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
EBTP × EI  -0.731 -5.038 
 (0.003) (0.026) 
EBTP × DCAP -0.747 -4.041 
 (0.655) (0.087) 
EBTP × EI × DCAP 1.413 11.066 
 (0.001) (0.004) 
CAP_Tier 1 -0.012 -0.015 
 (0.388) (0.286) 
Size -0.169 -0.170 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Tax -3.046 -3.263 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
 
N 587 586 
Adj. R2 0.144 0.132 
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TABLE 5  
Equity Incentives, Net Sales, and Earnings Management 
 
Panel A: Equity incentives and net sales 
 
This table reports the results from regressing CEOs’ net sales (%) in the one year period after 
earnings announcements on equity incentives and control variables: 
titititititi GrowthSizeEINetSale ,,3,2,1,01, Retβ ςγγγγ +++++=+      (3)  
titititi
tititititi
GrowthSize
DCAPEIDCAPEINetSale
,,3,2,1
,,2,1,001,
Ret
ββ
ςγγγ
βγ
++++
×+++=+
    (4)  
The estimation of this regression is based on 595 bank-years with data available in the sample 
period 1994-2005. The p-values in parentheses are based on two-sided t-tests. Please refer to the 
Appendix for variable measurement. 
 
 
Predicted 
Signs 
Overall effect of 
equity incentives 
(1) 
The effect of equity incentives 
conditional on DCAP 
(2) 
Intercept ? 0.129 0.069 
  (0.003) (0.111) 
EI  + 0.008 0.003 
  (0.001) (0.309) 
DCAP ?  -0.066 
   (0.001) 
EI × DCAP ?  0.061 
   (0.001) 
Size + -0.010 -0.001 
  (0.016) (0.806) 
Growth - -0.052 -0.078 
  (0.083) (0.011) 
Stock returns + 0.031 0.046 
  (0.080) (0.009) 
 
N  595 595 
Adj. R2  0.051 0.230 
Net effect of Equity Incentives for banks with low capital ratio 
20 ββ +  for total equity incentives 
 0.064 
 
  (0.001) 
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Panel B: Net sales and earnings management 
 
This table reports the results from regressing discretionary loan loss provisions (%) on CEOs’ net 
sales (%) in the year after earnings announcements and control variables: 
t,it,i4t,i3t,i2t,i1
t,i1t,i2t,i11t,i00t,i
TaxSize1Tier_CAPEBTP
DCAPNetSaleβDCAPNetSaleβDLLP
ςγγγγ
βγ
+++++
×+++= ++
              (5) 
This regression is estimated based on 595 bank-years with data available in the sample period 
1994-2005. The p-value in parentheses is based on two-sided t-tests. Please refer to the Appendix 
for variable measurement.  
  Overall effect of 
equity incentives 
(1) 
The effect of equity incentives 
conditional on DCAP 
(2) 
 
Intercept 0.880 0.896  
 (0.046) (0.043)  
NetSale -0.208 0.058  
 (0.081) (0.802)  
DCAP  0.016  
  (0.876)  
NetSale × DCAP  -0.360  
  (0.180)  
EBTP 4.287 4.304  
 (0.001) (0.001)  
CAP_Tier 1 0.001 -0.001  
 (0.941) (0.972)  
Size -0.153 -0.154  
 (0.001) (0.001)  
Tax -2.330 -2.351  
 (0.004) (0.005)  
N 595 595  
Adj. R2 0.117 0.117  
Net effect of NetSale for banks with low capital ratio 
20 ββ +     
 
-0.302 
(0.030) 
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Table 6 
Sensitivity Tests of H2: Using the absolute value of DLLP 
 
tititititi
titititi
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   (7)  
ABS(DLLP) is the absolute value of DLLP and it is in percent. This regression is estimated using 
600 firm-years with data available for equity incentives, net sales, discretionary loan loss 
provisions, and control variables in the period 1994-2005. The p-value in parentheses is based on 
two-sided t-tests. Please refer to the Appendix for variable measurement.  
 
 
Using Equity Incentives 
(1) 
 Using Net Sales 
(2) 
  
Overall effect  
of equity 
incentives 
The effect of  
equity incentives 
conditional on 
DCAP 
 
Overall 
effect of 
net sales 
The effect of  
net sales 
conditional on 
DCAP 
Intercept 0.363 0.275  0.584 0.562 
 (0.281) (0.421)  (0.068) (0.077) 
EI 0.041 0.026    
 (0.001) (0.070)    
EI × DCAP  0.062    
  (0.017)    
Net Sales    0.289 -0.178 
    (0.001) (0.285) 
Net Sales × DCAP     0.635 
     (0.001) 
DCAP  -0.091   -0.055 
  (0.292)   (0.459) 
EBTP -0.217 -0.166  -0.144 -0.180 
 (0.603) (0.694)  (0.728) (0.663) 
CAP_Tier 1 -0.024 -0.020  -0.026 -0.025 
 (0.007) (0.053)  (0.004) (0.014) 
Size -0.016 -0.003  -0.029 -0.027 
 (0.470) (0.879)  (0.137) (0.174) 
Tax 1.925 1.816  1.747 1.830 
 (0.001) (0.003)  (0.003) (0.002) 
N 585 586  580 580 
Adj. R2 0.054 0.058  0.052 0.066 
 
Net effect of Equity Incentives or Net Sales for banks with low capital ratio 
20 ββ +  
 0.088 
(0.001) 
  0.457 
(0.001) 
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Table 7  
Sensitivity Tests of H2: Alternative Proxies for Regulatory Intervention 
 
This table reports the coefficients and the accompanying p-value of the estimation of regression 
(3) using two alternative proxies for regulatory intervention: 
tititititi
tititititi
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DCAPEIDCAPEIDLLP
,,4,3,2,1
,,2,1,00,
1 ςγγγγ
βββγ
+++++
×+++=
−
  (2) 
DLLP is in percent. The indicator variable for potential regulatory intervention, DCAP, is defined 
as follows: 
- Column (1): DCAP is 1 for banks with Tier1 capital ratio in the bottom quartile of the 
corresponding size group, where size groups are classified based on the quartiles of market 
value each year; 
- Column (2): DCAP is 1 for banks with total capital ratio in the bottom quartile of the sample 
distribution each year. 
This regression is estimated using 600 bank-years with data available in the sample period 1994-
2005. The p-value in parentheses is based on two-sided t-tests. Please refer to the Appendix for 
variable measurement. 
 
 Proxies for regulatory intervention 
  
Low size-adjusted 
Tier 1 capital ratio 
(1)   
Low total capital 
ratio  
(2) 
Intercept 0.918  0.940 
 (0.052)  (0.046) 
EI 0.018  0.008 
 (0.393)  (0.667) 
DCAP 0.180  0.097 
 (0.133)  (0.389) 
EI × DCAP -0.086  -0.074 
 (0.013)  (0.040) 
EBTP 4.160  4.314 
 (0.001)  (0.001) 
CAP_Tier 1 -0.002  -0.003 
 (0.900)  (0.830) 
Size -0.152  -0.150 
 (0.001)  (0.001) 
Tax -2.438  -2.540 
 (0.004)  (0.002) 
 
N 600  600 
Adj. R2 0.116  0.116 
Net effect for low capital ratio banks 
20 ββ +  
-0.068 
(0.021)  
-0.066 
(0.044) 
 
